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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RON DENNIS SHEPHERD, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20030863-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of 
burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, a class B 
misdemeanor (R. 208-10). This court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the district court correctly conclude that the 
eyewitness testimony of the burglary victim was constitutionally 
reliable and, therefore, admissible at trial? 
"In reviewing the trial court's decision to admit [evidence 
of an eyewitness identification]," this Court "defer[s] to the 
trial court's fact-finding role by viewing the facts in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's decision 
to admit and by reversing its factual findings only if they are 
against the clear weight of the evidence." State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991). This Court reviews for correctness 
the trial court's determination that "the[] facts are sufficient 
to demonstrate reliability." Id. 
2. Can defendant prevail on his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel where he has not shown that his trial 
counsel performed deficiently by not submitting to the court the 
name, resume, and expected testimony of an expert on eyewitness 
testimony or that he suffered demonstrable prejudice as a result? 
In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was 
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance 
prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
This claim presents a question of law, reviewed on the record of 
the underlying trial. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, If 
16-17, 12 P.3d 92. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are 
dispositive. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count each of burglary and 
possession or use of a controlled substance, both second degree 
felonies; and one count each of theft and possession of drug 
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paraphernalia, both class B misdemeanors (R. 5-6). Before trial, 
he filed a motion to suppress eyewitness identification 
testimony, which the trial court denied after a hearing (R. 54-
63; R. 131-36 at addendum A; R. 261) . A jury subsequently 
convicted defendant of the burglary and theft charges (R. 192-
93). The court sentenced him to a suspended term of one-to-
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison on the felony charge, and 
180 days in jail on the misdemeanor, with credit for time served 
(R. 208-10). The court also ordered 100 hours of community 
service, a fine, and 36 months on probation with certain 
conditions imposed (Id.). Defendant filed this timely appeal (R. 
222) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Just after midnight on June 24, 2004, Mark Hartman, newly 
arrived home from a business trip, picked up his two teenaged 
children and drove to his home in Midway, which was in the 
process of being remodeled (R. 256: 70-71). As the family walked 
onto the front porch and began inspecting the new exterior 
construction, Hartman suddenly saw someone wearing shorts, a t-
shirt, and a backpack run out the back door (Id. at 73-75) . 
Hartman chased the man until he lost him, and then returned home 
(Id. at 75-76) . 
Hartman and the children entered the home through the back 
door (Id. at 7 6). Hartman immediately noticed that the 
refrigerator doors were open and a gallon of milk sat atop the 
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refrigerator (Id.). Upstairs, he found part of his computer on 
the hallway floor (Id.). In Hartman's bedroom, dresser drawers 
had been emptied, and all his clothing had been pulled from his 
closet (Id. at 77). A half gallon of ice cream, with a spoon 
stuck in it, rested on a chest of drawers (Icl) . 
Hartman took the children outside and called 911 on his cell 
phone (Id. at 78). As he finished the call, he saw a second man 
exit the home (Id.). This man wore shorts and a t-shirt and had 
a towel draped over his head like a bonnet, concealing his face 
(Id. at 7 9). Hartman yelled at him, and the man yelled back, 
making "a gesture with his arm as though he was carrying a 
weapon" (Id. at 80).x Hartman immediately directed his children 
to move slowly towards the car (Id.). Hartman himself carefully 
backed up, keeping his eyes on the man. When he was out of 
sight, Hartman dashed to the car (Id. at 81). 
With his family safely in the car, Hartman was about to 
drive off when he saw the same man, wearing a backpack, with the 
towel still draped over his head, come around the house on a 
bicycle and ride directly past him onto the street (Id. at 81-
82). Hoping the police would arrive soon, Hartman decided to 
follow him (Id. at 82, 84). As Hartman closed in on him, the man 
"turned on his bike, and acted as though he was going to shoot at 
my windshield" (Id. at 84). When the man made the same motion a 
1
 Because it was dark, Hartman could not tell what the man 
was holding (R. 256: 80). 
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second time, Hartman "hit the back of the bicycle" with his car 
(Id.). The man fell off his bicycle, and the towel fell from his 
head (Id. at 85). Defendant stood up and retrieved his bicycle 
(Id. at 86). Hartman testified that he had a good view of 
defendant: 
I had the high beams on on [sic] my vehicle. 
After I hit the individual, when he went to 
stand up, I had a very, very good view of him 
standing right in front of me, right in front 
of my car. It was like as though he were a 
deer in the headlights, and he was dazed 
also. 
Id. Hartman testified that defendant was not pointing anything 
at him during this time (Id. at 87). Hartman's attention was 
focused, the man was not more than a few feet beyond the hood of 
his car and, in addition to the car's high beams, a nearby street 
light illuminated the scene (Id. at 87-88, 101-02) . 
Defendant picked up his bicycle and then noticed that the 
back tire was nonfunctional. He dropped the bike and ran off 
(Id. at 86). The police arrived shortly thereafter. Despite a 
search, they could not locate either man that night (Id. at 171). 
Around 7:15 in the morning, a patrol officer located a 
possible suspect walking down the roadway less than half a mile 
from the burglarized home (Id. at 172). The suspect at first 
denied any involvement in the burglary but then quickly confessed 
and named defendant as his co-burglar (Id. at 111, 130, 136-37). 
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The suspect, Dustin Ward, testified at trial.2 He described 
buying methamphetamine from defendant in Salt Lake, deciding with 
defendant to go mountain biking around Midway, driving to The 
Homestead parking lot in a truck belonging to a friend who was a 
federal fugitive, and smoking methamphetamine along the way (Id. 
at 118-21, 137). He further testified to seeing a house under 
construction, riding over to it, climbing in a window, opening 
the door for defendant, removing a Coke from the refrigerator, 
and exploring the upstairs of the house (Id. at 122-25). 
Ward confessed to taking a pair of binoculars and a knife 
from the bedroom closet and said he saw defendant take a small TV 
(Id. at 125-26). He also saw defendant unhooking a computer 
because "[h]e wanted the lower part of [it]" (Id. at 127). Ward 
eventually went downstairs to retrieve his Coke. He heard 
voices, looked out the window, heard voices again, whistled a 
warning to defendant, and then ran away (Id. at 128). Ward spent 
the rest of the night in a nearby new home under construction. 
He was apprehended about twenty minutes after leaving the home 
the next morning (Id.). 
Officer Winterton, the investigating officer, responded to 
the scene of the burglary shortly after Mark Hartman called 911. 
Winterton saw the damaged bicycle and found a backpack nearby. 
In the backpack was a small TV, a key ring without any keys but 
2
 Ward was a convicted felon, serving a prison term at the 
time he testified (R. 256: 108, 134-35). He was on probation at 
the time of the burglary (Id. at 130). 
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with the name "Ron" on it and, apart from the key ring, the keys 
to the truck parked at The Homestead (Id. at 166-69). Police 
also found defendant's cell phone in the roadway near the bicycle 
(Id. at 169-70).3 
Just after 7:00 the next morning, Winterton witnessed the 
arrest of Dustin Ward, whom he interviewed later that morning at 
the sheriff's office (Id. at 171, 173). Winterton testified that 
Ward's trial testimony was consistent with what Ward had told him 
in the interview (Id. at 173). 
Three days after the burglary, based on his interview with 
Dustin Ward, Officer Winterton found a photograph of defendant 
online, printed it, and telephoned Mark Hartman (Id. at 174). 
Winterton "asked if [Hartman] could come to the sheriff's office 
and look at some pictures, see if he could identify the 
individual that he had seen, that he had stated he knocked off 
his bicycle" (Id.). At the sheriff's office, Hartman remembered 
seeing "more than one photograph" (Id. at 105). He remembered 
Winterton showing him two or three photos sequentially (Id. at 
106). Both Hartman and Winterton testified that the officer 
showed Hartman one or two photographs and that Hartman did not 
recognize the man on the bicycle in those photos. (Id. at 105-
06, 175). Winterton then presented the photo of defendant, to 
3
 Defendant maintained that either Dustin Ward had stolen 
the cell phone from him or that he "lost it" in his friend's 
truck (Id^ at 170). 
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which Hartman responded "immediately" and with 95% surety (Id. at 
176). Winterton testified that he did not compile a traditional 
photo array in this case "[bjecause I had the co-defendant give 
me the name of the suspect right out of the chute, within minutes 
of him being detained. I was asking Mr. Hartman to confirm what 
I believe I already knew" (Id. at 178; accord R. 261: 6). 
Although defendant presented several alibi witnesses, all of 
whom testified that he was at his mother's home enjoying a 
barbecue when the burglary occurred and that he left only long 
enough to purchase beer from a nearby grocery store, the jury 
nonetheless convicted him of burglary and theft (Id. at 210, 218; 
R. 257: 8-9, 11). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant contends that his conviction was primarily based 
on an unreliable and inadmissible photo identification by the 
victim. Without this eyewitness identification to bolster the 
testimony of co-burglar Dustin Ward, defendant asserts that the 
jury would have been more likely to believe his alibi witnesses 
and, consequently, to render a more favorable verdict. When the 
eyewitness identification is analyzed under the Ramirez factors, 
however, one conclusion becomes inescapable. Despite a less than 
optimal photo identification procedure, the totality of the 
factors bearing on reliability clearly demonstrate that the 
identification was at least as reliable as the Ramirez 
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identification. Consequently, the trial court did not err in 
admitting that evidence. 
Defendant also contends that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to submit the 
name, resume, and expected testimony of an eyewitness 
identification expert. This claim fails on both prongs of the 
ineffectiveness analysis. As to deficient performance, defense 
counsel may have rationally decided it would be more tactically 
advantageous to rely on the police officer's testimony that he 
did not follow standard procedure in presenting the photos to the 
witness and on the cautionary jury instruction than on a proffer 
from an expert that counsel knew the court was likely to reject. 
As to prejudice, defendant merely alleges it speculatively, with 
no record support. For these reasons, his ineffective assistance 
claim fails. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY 
DETERMINED THAT THE EYEWITNESS 
TESTIMONY OF THE BURGLARY VICTIM 
WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY RELIABLE AND, 
THEREFORE, ADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL 
Defendant argues that his conviction "was primarily based" 
on unreliable and, hence, inadmissible eyewitness identification 
testimony from the burglary victim (Br. of Aplt. at 18). Without 
this "critical" testimony, he contends, the jury would have found 
Dustin Ward's testimony less credible and his alibi witnesses 
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more credible, thus creating a "reasonable possibility" of a more 
favorable outcome (Id. at 26). 
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated the proper analytical 
framework for determining whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, an eyewitness identification is constitutionally 
reliable and, hence, admissible. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 781 (Utah 1991). The reliability analysis, rooted in due 
process, addresses five "areas of concern": 
1) the opportunity of the witness to view the 
actor during the event; 
2) the witness's degree of attention to the 
actor at the time of the event; 
3) the witness's capacity to observe the 
event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity; 
4) whether the witness's identification was 
made spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and 
5) the nature of the event being observed and 
the likelihood that the witness would 
perceive, remember and relate it correctly. 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986). "If the court 
finds the identification reliable in light of these five factors, 
then it is admissible under the Due Process Clause of the Utah 
Constitution." State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah App. 
1997). Moreover, if "the factors bearing on reliability clearly 
indicate that the identifications . . . were at least as reliable 
as the identifications in Ramirez," then this Court will 
"conclude that admission of the eyewitness identifications . . . 
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[does] not violate [defendant's] right to due process." State v. 
Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 1 64, 44 P.3d 794.4 
Here, the trial court held a pre-trial hearing on the 
constitutional reliability and admissibility of Mark Hartman's 
eyewitness testimony (R. 261) . It entered extensive findings of 
fact, which included findings addressing the five analytical 
factors. See R. 132-35 at addendum A. The court concluded that 
although "[t]he [photographic identification] procedure used was 
not optimal," nonetheless, NNunder the totality of the 
circumstances, the identifications are sufficiently reliable to 
be admitted as evidence at trial" (R. 131 at addendum A). The 
trial court did not err. The reliability factors in this case, 
considered in their totality, demonstrate that Mark Hartman's 
identification of defendant as the man who exited his home and 
rode in front of him on a bicycle far exceeded the reliability of 
the identification in Ramirez. 
1. Opportunity of witness to view the actor during the event. 
The Ramirez Court articulated several circumstances that are 
pertinent to this factor. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. 
4
 Defendant also claims that admitting the eyewitness 
testimony violated his federal constitutional rights. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 26. While defendant inadequately briefs this issue, it 
can nonetheless be disposed of easily. In Ramirez, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated, "[W]e think that our article I, section 7 
analysis is certainly as stringent as, if not more stringent 
than, the federal analysis required by [Neil v. Biqqers, 409 U.S. 
188 (1912)]." 817 P.2d at 784. As a result, even had defendant 
briefed the issue, a separate federal analysis would not be 
necessary. 
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a. Length of time and distance from which witness viewed the 
actor. 
In Ramirez, the witness testified that he viewed the actor 
for "a ^few seconds' or a^ second' to a^ minute' or longer." 817 
P. 2d at 782. Although the eyewitness stated that he viewed the 
actor from a distance of about ten feet, another witness 
indicated the distance may have been as much as thirty feet. Id. 
In this case, the trial court specifically found that "Mr. 
Hartman was able to watch the suspect for several seconds as the 
suspect stood directly in front of the headlights, apparently 
trying to figure out what to do. During this process, the 
suspect also looked directly at Mr. Hartman for a few seconds" 
(R. 134 at addendum A). Hartman testified that he was driving 
the car, and the suspect was directly in front of the car, a 
distance of approximately 6-7 feet (R. 256: 88). These 
circumstances are at least as favorable as those in Ramirez. 
b. Capability to view the actor's face. 
In Ramirez, a scarf "cover[ed] most of [the actor's] face." 
817 P.2d at 776. The eyewitness could only observe the actor's 
eyes and note that they were small. Id. at 782. Here, defendant 
held a towel around his head until Hartman hit his bicycle. Then 
the towel fell off, and defendant's face was fully visible (R. 
256: 85-86). This factor is also more favorable than in Ramirez. 
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c. Lighting. 
In Ramirez, the eyewitness observations occurred at 
nighttime in a parking lot. 817 P.2d at 776. Witnesses 
described the lighting variously as "good" and as "poor" and 
stated that "the gunman was in a shadowy area." Id. at 783. In 
this case, the trial court found that the victim's high beams 
were shining directly on defendant, giving the victim a clear 
view of defendant's illuminated face (R. 134 at addendum A; R. 
256: 86). In addition, a street light was shining directly over 
the point of impact (Id. at 87, 101). This factor is 
significantly more favorable than Ramirez. 
d. Distractions. 
Defendant contends that "there can be no question that" the 
victim was distracted by the presence of his teenaged children on 
the floor in the backseat of the car and by defendant pointing an 
unknown object at him (Br. of Aplt. at 23). The record provides 
no evidentiary support for defendant's speculation about the 
children. As for the possibility of a gun, Hartman testified 
that although he was "scared," he was also very "focused" (R. 
256: 89). In any event, the possibility of a gun created a less 
significant distraction than the unequivocal presence of a real 
gun wielded by a second robber in Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 776; see 
also Hollen, 2002 UT 35, SI 35 (presence of second perpetrator 
increases distraction level of eyewitness). 
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2. Degree of attention. 
Hartman had an unobstructed view of defendant after 
defendant fell from his bicycle in front of Hartman's car (Id. at 
85-87). At that juncture, Hartman's attention was not diverted 
by the threat of any weapon.5 Indeed, Hartman characterized 
defendant's demeanor like "a deer in the headlights" (Id. at 86). 
The trial court found that at this point defendant "was non-
threatening and apparently dazed" (R. 134 at addendum A). 
Any diversion posed by the earlier threat of a weapon or by 
the presence of Hartman's children crouched quietly in the 
backseat of the car "pales in comparison to the diversion created 
by the accomplice in Ramirez, who was swinging a pipe at the 
witness and threatening him during the witness's observations of 
the defendant." Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 1 38 (citing Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 783). 
3. Capacity to observe. 
"Here, relevant circumstances include whether the witness's 
capacity to observe was impaired by stress or fright at the time 
of the observation, by personal motivations, biases, or 
prejudices, by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, 
drugs, or alcohol." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. 
5
 Earlier in the encounter, defendant had made gestures 
with his hand suggesting he might have a gun (Id. at 80, 96,84, 
102). Hartman conceded that at these times, he was afraid he was 
going to get shot (Id. at 81). 
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The trial judge found that "[t]here is no evidence that Mr. 
Hartman was impaired by any visual defects, fatigue, drugs, or 
alcohol" (R. 132-33). This comports with Hartman's testimony 
that his vision was good, that he was not tired because he had 
slept on the plane ride home, and that he had not consumed any 
drugs or alcohol that day (R. 256: 89). He conceded that while 
the situation scared him, it also increased his focus on the 
perpetrator (Id. at 87). 
The circumstances in Ramirez presented far greater concerns 
that fear, stress, or injury affected the witness's capacity to 
observe. There, one robber struck the eyewitness with a pipe and 
told a second assailant, in the eyewitness's presence, to shoot 
and kill him if he caused any further problems. 817 P.2d at 776, 
783. 
4. Spontaneity, consistency, and suggestibility of the 
identification. 
Multiple circumstances are relevant to this factor. See 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. 
a. Length of time between observations and identification. 
Here, Hartman observed defendant just after midnight on June 
24th and identified his photo on the morning of June 26th (R. 256: 
165, 174; R. 261: 4). In Ramirez, the witness identified the 
actor at a show up "thirty minutes to an hour after the crime." 
817 P.2d at 783. Relying on Ramirez, however, Hollen later held 
that a photo array identification made two months after a robbery 
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and a lineup identification made more than a year after the 
robbery were both constitutionally reliable. See Hollen, 2002 UT 
35, 1 46. 
b. Mental capacity and state of mind at the time of 
identification. 
Hartman identified defendant in the quiet of the sheriff's 
office two days after the burglary (R. 133 at addendum A). The 
record evidence nowhere suggests that Hartman experienced any 
difficulty that might have impaired his ability to identify 
defendant or that he was under any unusual stress or agitation at 
the time. In contrast, the witness in Ramirez identified the 
actor within an hour of the robbery when, as the court opined, he 
might still be somewhat agitated, given the violent circumstances 
of the robbery. Nonetheless, the court found that "his state of 
mind did not otherwise influence his identification." Hollen, 
2002 UT 35, 148 (citing Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783). 
c. Exposure to opinions, descriptions, identifications, or 
other information. 
At the time of the Ramirez identification, "the witness knew 
. . . that police believed that the defendant matched the 
description of the suspect, and that another victim had not 
identified the suspect as one of the assailants." Id. at 5 53 
(citing Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783). Here, Hartman knew less: 
simply that the officer wanted to show him some photographs. The 
trial court found that "Sergeant Winterton did not make any 
comments to Mr. Hartman indicating any belief that the photograph 
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portrayed the same suspect seen by Mr. Hartman" (R. 132 at 
addendum A; R. 261: 11). 
d. Instances when witness or other eyewitness failed to 
identify defendant. 
In Ramirez, only one of three eyewitnesses was able to 
identify the defendant. 817 P.2d at 783. Here, Hartman, the 
only eyewitness, identified defendant when he first saw his 
picture and remained consistent in his identification thereafter. 
R. 256: 90-92. The trial court found that "Mr. Hartman has not 
wavered in identifying Defendant as the suspect" (R. 132 at 
addendum A). 
e. Consistency of witness descriptions. 
Hartman provided the police with only a minimal description 
of the burglar (R. 261: 17-18). His description, however, is 
irrelevant to the identification because the officer's undisputed 
testimony was that he showed Hartman the photograph based not 
Hartman's description but on the name Dustin Ward provided (R. 
261: 5, 20). 
f. Suggestibility of circumstances under which defendant 
was presented to the witness for identification. 
Here, Officer Winterton showed defendant 2-3 photos, one at 
a time (R. 256: 105-06, 175). Because the officer did not 
compile a traditional photo array, the court found that the 
identification procedure was "essentially a photographic xshow-
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up'" (R. 133 at addendum A).6 The court concluded that although 
"[t]he procedure used was not optimal," that factor alone was 
insufficient to render the identification constitutionally 
unreliable. R. 131 at addendum A. 
In comparison, the supreme court in Ramirez highlighted the 
"blatant suggestiveness" of the showup in that case, describing 
it as "troublesome," and yet still concluding that the evidence 
was admissible. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. The identification 
occurred "on the street in the middle of the night. Ramirez, 
with dark complexion and long hair, was the only person at the 
showup who was not a police officer." Id. He "stood with his 
hands cuffed to a chain link fence behind his back. The 
headlights of several police cars were trained on him." Id. 
Despite these highly suggestive circumstances, the supreme court 
held that the identification was constitutionally reliable. 
5. Nature of the event. 
Under this factor, a court should consider "^whether the 
event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the 
time it was observed, and whether the race of the actor was the 
same as the observer's.'" Id. at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 
6
 At the suppression hearing, the court characterized the 
procedure as "a show up without the real person" (R. 261: 27). 
For purposes of determining the threshold legal question of 
reliability, however, this characterization is not dispositive. 
All eyewitness identifications are measured against the same 
factors regardless of the particular police protocol employed. 
See, e.g., State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 44 P.3d 794 (lineup); 
State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 48 P.3d 953 (photo array); State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (1991) (showup) . 
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493). In Ramirez, the witnesses' attention was focused by their 
awareness of a robbery in progress. Here, Hartman knew his home 
had been burglarized. These circumstances are essentially the 
same. In Ramirez, however, the witnesses and the actor were of 
different races, while here, the trial court found that Hartman 
and defendant were of the same race (R. 133 at addendum A). 
In sum, after comparing the facts of this case to those in 
Ramirez, the trial court correctly concluded: "The [photo 
identification] procedure was not optimal. Nonetheless, under 
the totality of the circumstances, the identifications are 
sufficiently reliable to be admitted as evidence at trial" (R. 
131 at addendum A). Accordingly, defendant's claim fails. See 
Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 1 64 ("the factors bearing on reliability 
clearly indicate that the identification[] in this case [was] at 
least as reliable as the identification in Ramirez. Accordingly, 
. . . admission of the eyewitness identification into evidence 
did not violate [defendant]'s right to due process under Article 
I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution." 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL CLAIM FAILS WHERE HE HAS 
DEMONSTRATED NEITHER DEFICIENT 
PERFORMANCE BY HIS TRIAL COUNSEL 
NOR PREJUDICE RESULTING FROM THAT 
PERFORMANCE 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to provide the court with the name, resume, 
and expected testimony of an eyewitness identification expert 
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whom defense counsel wanted to call as a witness. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 27. He asserts that he was harmed by his counsel's 
omission because, given the strength of Mark Hartman's eyewitness 
testimony, "[t]he eyewitness expert very likely may have made a 
difference with an explanation of the fallibility associated with 
eyewitness testimony" (Br. of Aplt. at 28). 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was so 
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that, but for the deficient performance, a 
reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 4 66 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 
1990). Defendant's claim fails on both prongs of the 
ineffectiveness test. 
When assessing deficient performance, "a[n appellate] court 
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." 
State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997)(quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). "If a rational basis for counsel's 
performance can be articulated [this Court] will assume counsel 
acted competently." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah 
App. 1993). "[A]n ineffective assistance claim succeeds only 
when no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised 
from counsel's actions." Id. 
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In this case, defense counsel argued at the suppression 
hearing that he should be permitted to have an expert witness 
testify about "what's wrong with what [the police] did" in 
conducting the identification procedure (R. 261: 30). In 
response, the court noted that Officer Winterton planned to admit 
that he did not "follow correct police procedure with respect to 
identification" and that, in addition, the jury would receive a 
cautionary jury instruction warning that the reliability of 
eyewitness identification is "not that good" (Id. at 30; R. 33, 
34; see also R. 238-41 at addendum B). 
When defense counsel continued to advocate for an expert, 
the court responded, "And I know, I assume I know who you would 
call. I've heard his testimony probably three or four times. 
And I, I don't really think his testimony is helpful to the jury" 
(Id. at 33). Defense counsel pressed on, leading the court to 
finally end the discussion by stating, "What I'm going to do . . 
. on that particular issue is[,] I want you to designate who you 
. . . anticipate you would call. I want you to include . . . the 
CV and . . . a report as to what he would testify to" (Id. at 
35) . 
Trial counsel did not pursue this invitation, inaction that 
defendant construes as deficient performance. Defense counsel, 
however, might well have chosen not to pursue the expert witness 
for tactical reasons. The court's remarks indicated it was not 
particularly receptive to the utility of expert testimony in this 
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area. Indeed, it had suggested that expert testimony would only 
be duplicative of both the officer's own admission that he had 
not followed police protocol and of the lengthy, cautionary, 
eyewitness identification jury instruction. See R. 261: 33. 
Under such circumstances, defense counsel might well have thought 
it better trial strategy to rely on the cautionary instruction, 
the officer's testimony, and his own closing argument rather than 
bring before the court a proffer from an expert that the court 
was disinclined to accept and which was well within its 
discretion to reject. See State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 543, 
27 P.3d 1133 (trial court does not abuse its discretion when it 
refuses to admit expert testimony that would be "in the nature of 
a lecture to the jury as to how they should judge the facts"); 
State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 516, 48 P.3d 953 ("[A] trial 
court's refusal to admit evidence [does] not constitute an abuse 
of discretion when proffered expert testimony would amount to a 
lecture to the jury as to how they should weigh testimonial 
evidence"). Where, as here, a rational basis for defense 
counsel's tactical choice can be articulated, defendant's claim 
of deficient performance fails. See Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468. 
Defendant has also failed to demonstrate any prejudice 
flowing from his counsel's alleged error in not submitting the 
credentials and proposed testimony of his expert witness. "To 
show prejudice under the second component of the 
[ineffectiveness] test, a defendant must proffer sufficient 
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evidence to support a^ reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.'" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 
522 (Utah 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
Defendant's claim fails from the outset because he has not 
proffered any record evidence that would undermine confidence in 
the jury's verdict. Because neither the record nor his appellate 
brief details the substance of the proposed expert testimony, 
this Court has no basis upon which to judge whether that 
testimony would have amounted to anything more than a generalized 
lecture to the jury about how to judge the credibility of the 
eyewitness. Where defendant has wholly failed to demonstrate 
that the expert's testimony would have been admitted and, had it 
been admitted, that it would likely have made a difference to the 
outcome of the case, his claim of prejudice fails. "On many 
occasions, this court has reiterated that proof of ineffective 
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be 
a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 
(Utah 1993)(footnote omitted). Without demonstrable proof of the 
substance of the expert's testimony, defendant's allegation of 
prejudice stands as an unadorned and speculative claim. State v, 
Arquelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996). Consequently, it 
fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions for one count each of burglary, a second degree 
felony, and theft, a class B misdemeanor. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /f day of November, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
/MMAAJL-C 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RON DENNIS SHEPHERD, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
Case No. 021500129 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER came before the Court on Defendant's motion to 
suppress the out-of-court and in-court identifications of the eyewitness, Mark Hartman. 
Defendant was present and represented by counsel, J. Bruce Savage. The State was represented 
by Thomas Low. Evidence was taken and arguments were heard. The Court now being fully 
advised in the premises, makes and enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order. 
1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On June 24, 2002, Mark Hartman arrived at his home in Midway, Utah, with his 
two children, and discovered a man coming out of his house, who thereafter fled. 
Mr. Hartman then left his children outside, entered his home, looked around, and 
came back outside after confirming that his home had been burglarized. 
While Mr. Hartman was outside, a second intruder exited the home wearing a 
towel over his head to obscure his face. Mr. Hartman could not see the man's 
face through the towel. 
The second intruder (hereinafter "the suspect") pointed something at Mr. 
Hartman, which Mr. Hartman thought might be a gun, though it was too dark to 
be sure. Mr. Hartman told his children to get back in the car, and Mr. Hartman 
backed up, still facing the suspect until he turned a corner and then quickly got 
into his car. 
Mr. Hartman observed the suspect leaving his home on a bicycle. Mr. Hartman 
followed the suspect in his car, with his high-beams illuminating the suspect. The 
suspect, certainly in an attempt to dissuade Mr. Hartman from following him 
further, pointed something backwards toward Mr. Hartman's car. In response to 
this perceived threat, Mr. Hartman caused his vehicle to bump the suspect's 
bicycle, causing the suspect to fall from the bicycle and the towel he had 
2 
continued to wear to fall from his head. 
6. After the suspect fell from the bicycle, he got up and tried to get back on the 
bicycle. Mr. Hartman, whose headlights were still set on high-beam, looked at 
and clearly saw the suspect's face. The suspect apparently discovered that his 
bicycle's rear wheel had been bent rendering the bicycle inoperable. Mr. Hartman 
was able to watch the suspect for several seconds as the suspect stood directly in 
front of the headlights, apparently trying to figure out what to do. During this 
process, the suspect also looked directly at Mr. Hartman for a few seconds. The 
suspect then fled on foot. 
7. The following facts are pertinent in applying Ramirez's analysis to those moments 
after the suspect's towel fell from his head and stood in front of Mr. Hartman's 
vehicle: 
a. Opportunity: Mr. Hartman had a clear, unobstructed view of the suspect's 
face, his headlights providing direct illumination. 
b. Attention: Mr. Hartman was aware that his home had just been 
burglarized. The other burglar had fled previously and was no longer a 
distraction to Mr. Hartman. The suspect, having been violently knocked 
off his bicycle, was non-threatening and apparently dazed. 
c. Capacity: There is no evidence that Mr. Hartman was impaired by any 
3 
visual defects, fatigue, drugs, or alcohol. 
d. Nature of the Event: Mr. Hartman was aware of the burglary of his home; 
and the suspect was a Caucasian, same as Mr. Hartman. 
8. On June 26, 2002, Sergeant Jeff Winterton called Mr. Hartman and asked him to 
come to the Sheriffs Department to view a picture—essentially a photographic 
"show-up." Sergeant Winterton had obtained a picture of Defendant because the 
co-defendant in this case, Dustin Ward, had confessed to his own involvement in 
the burglary and had also implicated Defendant. 
9. When Mr. Hartman arrived at the Sheriffs Department, Sergeant Winterton 
showed him the picture of Defendant and asked him if that was the person that he 
had knocked off the bicycle two days previous. Mr. Hartman immediately 
responded that it was the same person, and clarified that he was ninety-five 
percent sure. 
10. Subsequent to this photographic identification, Mr. Hartman had no other 
exposures to Defendant, whether in person or by photograph, until the Preliminary 
Hearing held nearly five months later, on November 13, 2002. At that time he 
again identified Defendant as the suspect he had knocked off a bicycle. 
11. Concerning the method of identification employed by Sergeant Winterton, the 
following facts are relevant to the "Spontaneity and Consistency (Suggestibility)" 
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prong of the Ramirez analysis: 
a. The photographic identification occurred within two days of the burglary. 
b. Only a single photograph was used. 
c. The photograph was not an attempt to match a description provided by Mr. 
Hartman. 
d. Sergeant Winterton did not make any comments to Mr. Hartman 
indicating any belief that the photograph portrayed the same suspect seen 
by Mr. Hartman. 
e. Mr. Hartman's identification of Defendant as the suspect was immediate. 
f. Mr. Hartman has not wavered in identifying Defendant as the suspect. 
BASED ON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the 
following Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court must make a preliminary finding of threshold reliability before 
permitting the out-of-court and in-court identifications by Mr. Hartman to be 
admitted to a jury. It is the State's burden of proof. The standards for these 
threshold findings are set forth in State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), 
and its progeny. 
5 
2. In examining the facts of the present case in light of those of Ramirez, the Court 
concludes that the comparison is favorable. 
3. The procedure used was not optimal. Nevertheless, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the identifications are sufficiently reliable to be admitted as 
evidence at trial. 
BASED ON the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court now 
makes and enters the following Order. 
ORDER 
1. Defendant's motion to suppress the out-of-court and in-court identifications by 
Mr. Hartman is denied. 
2. As to Defendant's request for an expert witness, he is instructed to provide the 
Court, within ten days, the expert's curriculum vitae and report setting forth his 
expected testimony, whereupon the Court will rule on the request. 
DATED t h i s ^ day of May, 20Qi. 
<&P&— 
•^A**'** w w a ^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
J. BRUCE SAVAGE, Attorney for Defendant 
RULE 4-508 NOTICE 
You are hereby notified that the above Findings, Conclusions, and Order will be 
submitted to the Court eight days from the date that it was mailed to you unless you notify 
counsel for the State that you object to its form. 
THOMAS L. LOW 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 
r > ^ day of _ , 2003, 
I caused to be mailed, by first class mail postage prepaid a true^d correct copy of the foregoing 
to: 
J. BRUCE SAVAGE 
1790 BONANZA B 223 
P.O. BOX 2520 
PARK CITY, UTAH 84060 
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Addendum B 
A J J _ 1 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
One of the most important issues in this case is the identification of the defendant as the 
person who committed the crime. The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who committed the crime. If, after 
considering the evidence you have heard from both sides, you are not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. 
The identification testimony that you have heard was an expression of belief or 
impression by the witness. To find the defendant not guilty, you need not believe that the 
identification witness was insincere, but merely that the witness was mistaken in his belief or 
impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In considering whether the 
prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who 
committed the crime, you should consider the following: 
(1) Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the criminal actor? In 
answering this question, you should consider: 
(a) the length of time the witness observed the actor, 
(b) the distance between the witness and the actor, 
(c) the extent to which the actor's features were visible and undisguised, 
(d) the light or lack of light at the place and time of observation, 
is 
(e) the presence or absence of distracting noises or activity during the 
observation, and 
(f) any other circumstances affecting the witness's opportunity to observe the 
person committing the crime. 
(2) Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person committing the crime? In 
answering this question, you should consider whether the witness's capacity was 
impaired by: 
(a) stress or fright at the time of observation, 
(b) personal motivations, biases, or prejudices, 
(c) uncorrected visual defects, 
(d) fatigue or injury, 
(e) drugs or alcohol, or 
(f) by being a person of a different race from the criminal actor. 
(3) Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the criminal actor at the time of the 
crime? In answering this question, you should consider whether the witness knew 
that a crime was taking place during the time he observed the actor. Even if the 
witness had adequate opportunity and capacity to observe the criminal actor, he 
may not have done so unless he was aware that a crime was being committed. 
(4) Was the witness's identification of the defendant completely the product of his 
own memory? In answering this question, you should consider: 
(a) the length of time that passed between the witness's original observation 
and his identification of the defendant, 
(b) the witness's mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the 
identification, 
(c) the witness's exposure to opinions, to descriptions or identifications given 
by other witnesses, to photographs or newspaper accounts, or to any other 
information or influence that may have affected the independence of his 
identification, 
(d) any instances when the witness failed to identify the defendant, 
(e) any instances when the witness gave a description of the actor that is 
inconsistent with the defendant, 
(f) the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to the witness 
for identification. You may take into account that an identification made 
by picking the defendant from a group of similar individuals is generally 
more reliable than an identification made from the defendant being 
presented alone to the witness. You may also take into account that 
identifications made from seeing the person are generally more reliable 
than identifications made from a photograph. 
If, after considering the evidence you have heard from the prosecution and the defendant, 
and after evaluating the eyewitness testimony in light of the considerations listed above, you 
have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you 
must find him not guilty. If, on the other hand, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you must find him guilty. 
